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Abstract
We investigate international assignment (IA) location decisions of emerging market ﬁrms as determined by the
institutional contexts of their home and host countries. Using an institutional perspective, assignment patterns of the
entire ﬁrm population in Slovenia to either other emerging or developed host countries in Europe are analysed. The
ﬁndings show that both institutional quality and distance inﬂuence expatriation ﬂows in ﬁrms from a low quality
institutional context. These ﬁrms expatriate more to markets with high quality institutions and choose host countries
with higher rather than smaller institutional distance for their IAs. We reﬁne institutional theory with respect to host and
home country institutional determinants of expatriation decisions by taking into consideration the particular features of
emerging markets and their ﬁrms e separately and compared to developed markets and their ﬁrms.
Keywords: Geographic labour mobility, Labour management, International assignments, Location choice, Internationalization, Institutional theory, Emerging markets
JEL classiﬁcation: F2

Introduction
ith globalisation, ﬁrms have recorded an
upsurge of international business activities
(Baskaran et al., 2011). Operating across nation
states has put immense pressure on internationalising businesses and their internationally mobile
employees that have to adjust to multiple and
diverse economic, political, legal, and social contexts
(Black, Mendenhall & Oddou, 1991; Brookes et al.,
2011; Zaheer, 1995). Characteristics of and differences in institutional environments have been
identiﬁed as some of the main barriers to business
internationalisation (Hilmersson & Jansson, 2012)
that also affect international stafﬁng decisions by
ﬁrms (Conti, Parente & de Vasconcelos, 2016; Gaur,
Delios & Singh, 2007). Institutions as determinants
of internationalisation strategies and the related
stafﬁng approaches are particularly relevant in
emerging markets and for emerging market ﬁrms
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(Buckley & Tian, 2017; Chan, Isobe & Makino, 2008;
Moreira & Ogasavara, 2018). This is because these
ﬁrms' unfavourable domestic institutional environments co-shape their capacities to engage in (international) business and stafﬁng and propel them to
search for alternative ways to develop their
competitive advantages compared to the often
internationally more experienced ﬁrms from more
stable and resource-rich developed market environments (see e.g. Buckley, Devinney & Louviere,
2007). Their host institutional environments also
necessitate certain strategic adjustments e especially when these environments are institutionally
dissimilar to those at home (see e.g. Benito &
Gripsrud, 1992).
The concept of ‘emerging market economies’ refers
to low-income, rapid-growth countries using economic liberalisation and adoption of a free-market
system as the primary engine of growth (Hoskisson
et al., 2000). While substantial work has examined the
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internationalisation and international stafﬁng of
developed market ﬁrms (see e.g. Ando & Paik, 2013;
Chan et al., 2008; Gaur et al., 2007), little research has
investigated the global expansion of emerging market ﬁrms and their related international stafﬁng
practices (for an exception see e.g. Zhu et al., 2018).
Beyond a few authors (e.g. Ando & Paik, 2013; Gaur
et al., 2007; Moreira & Ogasavara, 2018), there has
also been limited research into home and host
countries' institutional environments and their
separate or combined impact on international assignments (IAs). This is surprising, given the speciﬁc
characteristics of emerging markets determining
their ﬁrms' features and the stark differences between emerging and developed markets that are
likely to affect ﬁrms' international business and IA
decisions (Buckley & Tian, 2017; Peng, Wang & Jiang,
2008; Scullion, Collings & Gunnigle, 2007). Our
research sets out to address this gap and investigates
emerging market ﬁrms' international stafﬁng decisions as determined by home and host country
institutional contexts.
Emerging market economies are marked with
weak, scarce, inadequate, unpredictable, volatile,
uncodiﬁed, and poorly enforced institutions (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Chan et al., 2008) that can be
detrimental to business performance (McMillan,
2008; Meyer et al., 2009). The market and institutional imperfections in emerging economies propel
emerging market ﬁrms to (1) develop particular
ownership advantages, such as ﬂexibility, economic
use of resources, home country embeddedness, and
business, ethnic, and institutional relationship
management and networking skills for access to
resources controlled by others (Buckley et al., 2007;
Jain, Lahiri & Hausknecht, 2013; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012); (2) take advantage of emerging market
speciﬁc location advantages, such as cheap labour
and natural resources (Buckley & Tian, 2017); and (3)
capitalise on the home experiences-based resources
(including the capability to recruit, shape, and
motivate cost-effective employees and the knowledge of and the ability to operate in institutionally
unstable and weak business environments) (Jain
et al., 2013; Zeng & Williamson, 2007).
The labour market deﬁciencies in emerging markets in particular also impact the emerging market
ﬁrms' international stafﬁng and international
assignment management. More speciﬁcally, they
make it more challenging. Several factors support
this claim. First, emerging market ﬁrms are marked
with short internationalisation histories and
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predominantly domestic governance and career
development (Jaklic, 2007; Meyer & Xin, 2018; Tung,
2007), which restricts the individuals' awareness of
international career opportunities and reduces their
willingness to expatriate as well as limits the ﬁrms'
power relative to the internationally mobile recruits.
Second, a negative country of origin image renders
emerging market ﬁrms less competitive in their
battle for best talent against developed market ﬁrms
(see e.g. Alkire, 2014; Pettigrew & Srinivasan, 2012).
Emerging market ﬁrms thus often use alternative
international stafﬁng practices, such as recruitment
of host-country nationals with prior work experience in the ﬁrm's country of origin or members of
the diaspora living in the host country (Meyer &
Xin, 2018). Third, because of the limited resources
for investments in employee development and
mobility, as well as underdeveloped human resources management business function and practices in emerging market ﬁrms (see e.g. Svetlik et al.,
2010),1 international assignments in these are likely
to be limited in number (see e.g. Luo & Tung, 2007)
and international assignees are likely to be required
to master multiple and interdisciplinary dimensions
of doing business (Svetlicic, 2006).
International stafﬁng and IAs in particular have
nonetheless been recognised as a primary tool for
addressing institutional differences between home
and host markets (Collings, Scullion & Morley, 2007;
Gaur et al., 2007) also for emerging market ﬁrms.
With IAs, ﬁrms can control and coordinate their
internationally dispersed operations, and thereby
better balance the classic ‘global integration versus
local responsiveness’ dilemma in international
business (Caligiuri & Colakoglu, 2007). IAs enable
ﬁrms to ﬁll positions when (adequately skilled or
sufﬁcient) local labour is not available; facilitate
knowledge development, sharing, and transfer
(Edstr€
om & Galbraith, 1977; Minbaeva & Michailova, 2004); and assist coordination of an enterprise's
network by linking its internationally dispersed
units through different forms of control (e.g. direct
surveillance, socialisation of host employees, and
development of internal informal communication
networks e depending on the type of investment,
development stage, and level of localisation of a host
unit (Harzing, 2001)).
However, several authors suggest that ﬁrms from
emerging markets may follow a different approach
to implementing and managing expatriation
compared to ﬁrms from developed economies
(Caligiuri & Bonache, 2016; Horwitz & Budhwar,

These ﬁrms are also affected by an overall lack of skilled employees in their domestic environments (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Tung, 2007).
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2015). Yet, Briscoe (2014) laments the paucity of
research of expatriation from emerging markets.
While there are some studies in the international
business literature that investigate IAs from
emerging market countries (mostly China) to other
emerging markets, those studies focus predominantly on talent and trust issues (Jackson & Horwitz,
2017; Li & Wang, 2010). They largely overlook
institutional context-related factors; even though
economic, political, and legal institutions have a
strong impact on corporate success (Akkermans,
Castaldi & Los, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001). A better
understanding of the conditions for expatriation
from emerging markets to both other emerging and
developed markets is needed, as this could help us
explore the role of institutions in international
stafﬁng and business internationalisation from such
contexts instead of solely from developed markets
and by developed market ﬁrms (Conti et al., 2016;
Dabic, Gonzalez-Loureiro & Harvey, 2015). In our
paper, we thus look at the impact of institutions in
emerging markets on international assignment determinants during business internationalisation.
This allows us to test institutional theory for international stafﬁng decisions in emerging market and
emerging market ﬁrm contexts as well as develop
practical implications for general and human resources managers in emerging market ﬁrms for
their more effective and efﬁcient international
business and international stafﬁng decision-making.
These are summarised in the discussion and conclusions section.
As called for by Jaklic, Raskovic and Schuh (2018),
our research concentrates on the region of Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE), which includes Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (OECD, 2001). We
focus on Slovenia within this under-researched
emerging markets region (Trąpczy
nski & Gorynia,
2017) and explore its ﬁrms' IAs to emerging and
developed market economies in order to add to our
understanding of the impact of institutions on
global assignment patterns.2 We study employee
movements across European Union (EU) countries,
the European Economic Area (EEA) e i.e. Lichtenstein, Iceland, and Norway; and Switzerland due to
the common legal principle of employee mobility
across these states' borders. Thus, it is not the legal
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inhibitors but rather the market as well as institutional forces that inﬂuence ﬁrms' expatriation decisions (Favell & Hansen, 2002). We address the
following research question: What is the impact of
institutions on emerging market (Slovenian-based) ﬁrms'
decisions to implement international assignments in
emerging (CEE) compared to developed (European nonCEE) markets?
We base our theoretical framework on institutional theory (c.f. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott,
1995) as a framework particularly well-suited to
studying ﬁrms' IA location choices due to its
contextual focus. We contribute to the institutional
and international business literature through
researching ﬁrms' IA location decisions in three
ways. First, we expand our knowledge of internationalisation and expatriation patterns of
emerging market ﬁrms. Against the prediction of
the institutional literature that ﬁrms are more likely
to send expatriates to countries with weak institutions in order to manage risk and uncertainty,
we ﬁnd that emerging market companies assign
their staff predominantly to states that are characterised by strong and stable institutional contexts.
This nuances our understanding and application of
institutional theory. Second, we advance expatriation and international business theory by emphasising the importance of diverse institutional
contexts. We outline some of the challenges of weak
institutions and identify the role of commercial
diplomat. I.e. we argue that international assignees
engage in activities usually pertaining to commercial diplomacy, such as trade policy-making and
business support activities (see e.g. Naray, 2008;
Saner & Yiu, 2003); and facilitate business through
co-designing the business environment that ﬁrms
operate in. Third, we provide an empirical advance
by identifying different patterns in relation to ﬁrms
assigning employees to emerging and developed
markets. Overall, we call for a more holistic research
approach that explores individual (micro), organisational (mezzo), and broad institutional (macro)
elements in investigating global assignment ﬂows
and patterns.

1 Institutions as determinants of ﬁrms'
international assignment location decisions
A highly popular framework to categorise organisational assignment motives is that of Edstr€
om and

2
We acknowledge that the CEE region is highly diversiﬁed: in terms of the relative size, importance, and performance, developmental trajectories and
levels of economic and socio-cultural development, as well as human resources management (HRM) conceptualisation, institutionalisation, and practice in
individual countries (see e.g. Brewster, Buciuniene & Morley, 2010; McCann & Schwartz, 2006; Morley, Minbaeva & Michailova, 2012). Since there are some
institutional differences also within the EU, we suggest that CEE countries are nonetheless institutionally more comparable to one another than to non-CEE
EU member states.
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Galbraith (1977). A ﬁrst category distinguishes
control and coordination reasons, where assignees
diminish uncertainty and agency problems. A second category points to ﬁlling skill gaps, where ﬁrms
cannot ﬁnd adequate resources in the local market
and use assignees from other markets instead. A
third category identiﬁes global business capability
development so that the internationally assigned
individuals and their colleagues may become the
global leaders of the future. Other authors have
added knowledge transfer motives as a further
dimension (Hocking, Brown & Harzing, 2004). These
assignment motivations are based on corporate
goals but they largely neglect the broader institutional context that inﬂuences ﬁrms' assignment
location decisions. We use institutional theory to
explain why ﬁrms from emerging market economies
might utilise IAs and whether they are more likely
to send expatriates to other emerging or developed
markets.
1.1 Institutional quality and international
assignments
Institutions are more or less codiﬁed (Ahlstrom &
Bruton, 2006) ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990) that
determine social relationships, actors' roles in them,
and standards and expectations for legitimate action
by actors in a certain context (Ahlstrom & Bruton,
2006; Ando & Paik, 2013). One of the key roles of
institutions is to reduce uncertainty through
restricting ﬁrms' strategic options in a speciﬁc
context (Friel, 2011; Meyer et al., 2009). When institutions are inadequate or poorly enforced, ﬁrms
tend to rely on other uncertainty reduction tools,
such as international assignments, instead (Berry,
2017; Moreira & Ogasavara, 2018). ‘Poor institutions’
is a concept related to the quality and stability of
regulatory provision. Poor institutions can be seen
to exist when the enforcement of norms, regulations, and regulatory provisions is weak (Buonanno
et al., 2015). This lower institutional quality creates
costs and problems that may be especially pertinent
where institutions are more recent and less developed e i.e. in many emerging market economies
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Lombardo, 2000).
Institutions can be deconstructed into economic,
political, legal, and social institutions. Economic
institutions refer to market intermediaries that
determine the incentives for and constraints on
economic actions (Chan et al., 2008; North, 1990).
Political institutions are comprised of governments
and the constraints they impose on actors through
different policies (Chan et al., 2008). Legal institutions refer to distinct legal systems that govern

speciﬁc forms of social behaviour within the overall
legal system (Ruiter, 2001). Social institutions
include a set of positions, roles, norms, and values
that generate relatively stable and regular patterns
of human behaviour in recurrent situations aimed at
sustaining viable societal structures (Schotter, 1981
in Langlois, 1986; Turner, 1997).
The expatriation and international management
literature has often concentrated on cultural differences and thereby social institutional context factors
(Caligiuri, 2012; Haslberger, Brewster & Hippler,
2013). However, recent studies have shown that
these institutions may not explain the ﬁrm's international business-related decisions (including those
on international stafﬁng) well. Harzing and Pudelko
(2016) are particularly critical of the concept of cultural distance as the central measure of social institutions
in
international
business.
They
empirically show that the differences in home and
host country contexts rather than (cultural) distance
between them have greater power in explaining the
ﬁrm's choice of market entry mode. They describe
cultural distance as “nothing more than a proxy for
factors that really matter” (Harzing & Pudelko, 2016,
p. 10, original emphasis). Brookes et al. (2011) come
to a similar conclusion in their empirical study on
the determinants of organisational HRM practices,
whereas Kazlauskaite_ et al. (2013) present a similar
case for non-culture related determinants of HRM
practices in CEE countries. We thus focus on economic, political, and legal institutions that impact
assignment choices and neglect the socio-cultural
institutions that act as their proxy.
Combined or individually, these three groups of
institutions determine the level of and variation in
foreign afﬁliate performance as well as international
stafﬁng practices (Chan et al., 2008; Gaur et al.,
2007). When addressing economic institutions, authors argue that poor availability of and access to
credible local informants about a foreign business
environment in less developed markets can be
compensated for by ﬁrms' participation in informal
networks (e.g. business groups) and through relationship building (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Peng,
2000, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996). As trustworthy
boundary spanners (i.e. connectors and mediators)
between enterprise units (Ando & Paik, 2013;
Reiche, Harzing & Kraimer, 2009) as well as between
various organisations in multiple countries, international assignees can play a key role in relationship
building. They are socialised into and trusted by the
ﬁrm (Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Tan & Mahoney,
2006). In addition, international assignees possess
parent ﬁrm knowledge (Harzing, Pudelko & Reiche,
2016; Reiche et al., 2009) and can transfer this to local
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operations (Chang, Gong & Peng, 2012; Gaur et al.,
2007) and back. Overall, expatriates are useful in
minimising agency problems and other uncertainties ampliﬁed through distance and poor institutions (Berry, 2017). Extant research shows that
ﬁrms are thus more likely to assign employees to
volatile economies, which are short of skilled local
labour (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Tung, 2007). However, most studies on international assignments in
emerging market contexts focus on developed
market ﬁrms assigning their employees to emerging
markets (e.g. Beddi & Mayrhofer, 2010) rather than
on emerging market ﬁrms assigning their employees abroad (for an exception see Zhu et al.,
2018). We test the following hypothesis speciﬁcally
for emerging market ﬁrms:
 H1a: A lower quality of economic institutions in
the host country is positively related to the use of
international assignments by emerging market
ﬁrms.
In terms of political institutions, (perceived) political risk increases the level of information processing that occurs between the afﬁliate and
corporate headquarters (Boyacigiller, 1990). It augments the need for stronger control and coordination mechanisms (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981)
and leads to higher instances of stafﬁng units with
international assignments (Ferner, Quintanilla &
S
anchez Runde, 2006; Kanter, 1977). In contrast, if
political institutions are well developed, there is a
local pool of skilled (public) professionals with
whom the organisation can work. The ﬁrm is also
less likely to assign employees abroad with the aim
of interacting with the government (Gaur et al.,
2007). We thus propose that:
 H1b: A lower quality of political institutions in
the host country is positively related to the use of
international assignments by emerging market
ﬁrms.
In relation to the legal institutional environment of
the assignee host country, transparency of laws and
their adequate enforcement are the key determinants
of doing business in a particular market. Poor legal
institutions imply poor protection of intellectual
property rights and costly corruption (Chan et al.,
2008). Berry (2017) argues that international assignees
can limit the unintended knowledge spillovers
occurring during ﬁrm internationalisation due to
poor institutional protections for intellectual property. We add to this, and argue that international
assignees can also act as commercial diplomats
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(lobbying for institutional change in a foreign market
on the ﬁrm's behalf) in environments with poor legal
institutions. Boddewyn (1988) and Boddewyn and
Brewer (1994) suggest that corruption may even
create opportunities for foreign ﬁrms to engage in
political behaviour e a role that may be performed
by assignees. We propose that:
 H1c: A lower quality of legal institutions in the
host country is positively related to the use of
international assignments by emerging market
ﬁrms.
In summary, we propose that poor institutions
promote the assignment of parent-country nationals in subsidiaries for their inter-organisational
networking role, for commercial diplomacy, and for
(knowledge) control purposes. Given that the academic literature has concentrated on cultural differences between countries and their impact on
expatriation (Dickmann, Suutari & Wurtz, 2018), it
is crucial that our research assesses the hitherto
neglected economic, political, and legal institutional pressures on ﬁrms' international stafﬁng
decisions.
1.2 Institutional distance and international
assignments
International ﬁrms do not exist in one national
institutional environment, but rather operate in at
least two contexts (Xu, Pan & Beamish, 2004) e and
encounter pressures for compliance with both
(Rugman & D'Cruz, 1993), thereby bridging institutional distance. Phillips, Tracey, and Karra (2009,
p. 343) deﬁne institutional distance as “a measure of
the differences in the cognitive, regulative and
normative institutions that characterize the relevant
organizational ﬁelds in the home and host environments and the degree of institutional uncertainty
in the host country.” Normally, ﬁrms are most
cognisant of their domestic institutional environments. Since no two markets are identical, internationalisation aimed at the exploitation of the ﬁrmspeciﬁc resources and location-speciﬁc advantages
of a particular host country (Dunning & Lundan,
2008) always presents a certain level of (institutional) uncertainty. Differences in home and host
institutional environments thus necessitate (additional) learning about the new environments (Benito
& Gripsrud, 1992) in order to reduce uncertainty
(Perkins, 2014).
Here, we do not refer only to the institutional
distance between home and host markets, but also
to the institutional distance between the country of
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the new foreign entry and the closest country in
which the ﬁrm is already active. Hutzschenreuter,
Kleindienst and Lange (2014) describe this feature of
internationalisation
and
internationalisation
learning as the added distance. Biased by the ‘lessons’ already learnt, ﬁrms are expected to agglomerate their international activities in additional
foreign markets that are similar to their home
environment over time (Barkema & Vermeulen,
1997). Only once ﬁrms gain more experience can
they re-combine the acquired knowledge in order to
use it in new (also more distant) environments. As
the ﬁrms' (institutional) knowledge base expands, so
does the range of their future internationalisation
choices (Cyert & March, 1963; Perkins, 2014). We
argue that international assignment patterns will
reﬂect the cumulative and gradual nature of
learning as well.
When the differences between ﬁrms' home and
host environments are large, as is the case for businesses operating in both emerging and developed
economies, the opposing institutional pressures can
result in potentially conﬂicting business practices
(Brouthers, Brouthers & Werner, 2008) and increased
transaction costs due to the strategic adjustments and
learning investments needed (Carlson, 1974; Eriksson et al., 1997). It is likely that emerging market
ﬁrms will focus their international assignment efforts
on a group of institutionally similar markets (either
individually or as a region) to diminish the learning
costs (Boeh & Beamish, 2012).
Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum (2012) argue that
addressing the question of how two entities (e.g.
markets) differ, and not merely focusing on how
much they differ, could prove more insightful for
researching the impact of institutions on international business. They suggest that, when analysing
the impact of institutional differences on internationalisation and international stafﬁng, the direction (rather than solely the magnitude) of
distance should also be considered (Zaheer et al.,
2012). This means that institutional distance may
have a different impact depending on whether an
emerging or developed market ﬁrm is entering an
emerging or a developed market (Beugelsdijk,
Ambos & Nell, 2018).
For emerging market ﬁrms, other emerging markets classify as institutionally proximate markets,
where emerging market ﬁrms have the advantage of
possessing operational knowledge in dealing with
institutional weaknesses, such as poorly functioning
capital, labour, and information markets (Banerjee,
Prabhu & Chandy, 2015; Khanna & Palepu, 2000).
These markets nevertheless present a certain level
of uncertainty for emerging market ﬁrms due to the

frequent changes in their institutional environments
(Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Trąpczy
nski & Gorynia,
2017). Developed markets, on the other hand, are
classiﬁed as institutionally distant markets (see also
Phillips et al., 2009) with the already well-developed
institutions that emerging market ﬁrms have little or
no direct experience with (Banerjee et al., 2015). We
thus argue that from the perspective of emerging
market ﬁrms, developed markets rather than other
emerging markets present greater risks, uncertainties, and market entry costs. Emerging market ﬁrms' unfamiliarity with the more developed
contexts can increase the uncertainties of these ﬁrms
operating in such environments. We thus posit that:
 H2: Emerging market ﬁrms are more likely to
implement international assignments to emerging
markets compared to developed markets.
Contrary to this hypothesis, Ando and Paik (2013)
ﬁnd a positive relationship between institutional
distance and the absolute number of parent-country
nationals assigned to the subsidiary, but discover a
negative relationship between institutional distance
and the ratio of parent-country nationals to subsidiary employees. The authors attribute these
‘mixed’ ﬁndings to ﬁrms (1) overcoming a lack of
legitimacy by employing more locals and at the
same time (2) maintaining control over foreign operations by increasing the absolute number of
parent-country nationals in institutionally distant
markets. However, since these ﬁndings are based on
data on developed market ﬁrms, they may not apply
to emerging market ﬁrms internationalising into
distant developed markets, as legitimacy and control issues in the institutionally more developed
markets are different from the ones in emerging
market economies (McMillan & Woodruff, 2002).
In addition, even if emerging market ﬁrms faced
the same stafﬁng challenges as developed market
ﬁrms in the institutionally distant economies, they
would have limited capacities to address them. This
is because emerging market ﬁrms are faced with
shortages of international managers (Meyer & Xin,
2018) and a general difﬁculty in hiring skilled employees (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Tung, 2007).

2 Methods
In our study, we focus on a single emerging
market home country (Slovenia). We analyse its
entire ﬁrm population's international stafﬁng decisions to destination countries in other emerging
and developed markets in EU member states as well
as Lichtenstein, Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway.
Such an approach allows for analysis of the
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institutional determinants of ﬁrms' international
assignment location decisions not only in terms of
institutional quality and distance, but also in terms
of institutional direction. It is also consistent with
Zaheer et al.’s (2012) recommendation on ﬁxing one
entity as the focal entity and deﬁning all other entities of interest with respect to the focal entity in the
analysis in order to incorporate direction in
research. CEE countries are regarded as emerging
market economies and non-CEE European countries as the institutionally more developed
economies.
The selection of Slovenia as the focal (home)
market is purposeful and based on the theorybuilding potential of the case. Businesses from
small, open economies demonstrate a higher propensity to internationalise (Bellak & Cantwell, 1998;
Svetlicic, Rojec & Trtnik, 2000). We ﬁnd Slovenia, a
small country, to be particularly suitable for analysing foreign assignment patterns, because it has a
very open economy in terms of trade (exports
represent 78% and imports 69% of GDP) and has
relatively large inward and outward FDI stock (31%
and 14% of GDP, respectively) (2016 data from Bank
of Slovenia [Banka Slovenije], 2017). In addition, as a
small emerging market economy, Slovenia is relatively under-researched.3 A further reason to choose
Slovenia was data access that provided the opportunity to explore the entire ﬁrm population in a
country with respect to actual IA patterns.
2.1 Data and methodology
The empirical study uses national data from
several separate datasets. Data on IAs record expatriates' change in the country of residence and are
gathered by the Health Insurance Institute of
Slovenia. Data for 2015 include a list of all ﬁrms with
IAs and the total number of assignments per ﬁrm.
Data for 2016 additionally include the number of
different employees sent abroad and the number of
assignments to each host country. Information on
IAs is reported solely for EU member states as well
as Lichtenstein, Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway.
In 2015, IAs to these countries were recorded by
4882 ﬁrms operating in Slovenia (excluding sole
proprietors). The dynamics of the expatriate landscape can be inferred from the growth to 5529
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assigning businesses in 2016. Despite data being
limited to a region of host countries, the European
context provides a basis for a more homogeneous
environment in terms of regulatory regime related
to factor mobility and international business. Firmlevel data on the entire population of enterprises in
Slovenia are collected yearly by the AJPES Agency
(i.e. Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public
Legal Records and Related Services). We use
detailed balance sheets and income statements of
companies for the period of 2015e2016. These data
are expressed in euros and deﬂated using the
appropriate producer and consumer price indices
with the baseline price level of 2016. For 2015 and
2016, the dataset includes 65,220 and 65,603 ﬁrms,
respectively. We link these two data sources with
detailed data on trade in goods from the Slovenian
Customs Administration, and data on trade in services and ﬁrm-level foreign direct investment data
from the Bank of Slovenia.
Our approach to studying the patterns of IAs is
primarily focused on the extensive margin of assignments by looking into decisions of ﬁrms to send
employees into a particular country. Country-speciﬁc information on IAs is only available for 2016. To
study the determinants of IA decision, we apply a
binary response model where our dependent variable is dichotomous with yic ¼ 1 if ﬁrm i sent at least
one employee to country c in year 2016 and yic ¼ 0
otherwise. We therefore expand our dataset to allow
each ﬁrm to assign an employee to each of the
available 31 host countries. The conditional probability is given by:
Pðyic ¼ 1jxi ;xc ;xic Þ¼ Fðb0 þ xi bI þ xc bC þ xic bIC þ uic Þ

ð1Þ

where F( ) is a speciﬁed function (logistic distribution cdf in logit, standard normal cdf in probit, or cdf
of the extreme value distribution in a complementary log-log model), xi is the vector of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
explanatory variables, xc is comprised of hostcountry-speciﬁc determinants, and xic is a set of
variables that vary across ﬁrms as well as across
markets. We report the results from logit estimates
with standard errors clustered by ﬁrms. In addition,
we use a probit and a complementary log-log model
as a robustness check, since some studies show that
the latter perform better than logit or probit for rare

3
We classify Slovenia as an emerging market economy based on (1) the poor quality of institutions in the country, (2) its political instability, (3) its
regional afﬁliation to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the related emerging market country image, and (4) it belonging to coordinated market
economies that are characterised by institutionalised rather than market-based coordination (see also Jaklic, Kolesa & Rojec, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018;
Feldmann, 2006; Meyer & Peng, 2016). In other words, rather than grounding our classiﬁcation of countries in economic indicators of the level of development in a country, we look at institutional factors, which is consistent with the focus of the study on the institutional context as the central part of the
analysis at the macro level.
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events data such as ours (see Calabrese & Osmetti,
2013).4
We include a broad set of control variables beyond
those that test Hypotheses 1e2, because excluding
them would produce omitted-variable bias. For
example, omitting the information on ﬁrms'
geographical patterns of exports, imports, and FDI
would falsely attribute their effects on IAs to host
country institutional quality or IA agglomeration
forces. The vector of ﬁrm-level regressors xi includes:
total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of ﬁrm
productivity, estimated according to the Ackerberg,
Caves and Frazer (2015) method, a logarithm of
employment (emp) and a logarithm of revenue to account for ﬁrm size, a dummy for exporters
(I(exporter)), the share of exports in total revenue
(export share), a foreign ownership indicator (inFDI ),
and a dummy for outward foreign direct investment
(outFDI ) to account for ﬁrms' integration in global
value chains, a logarithm of average wage per
employee (avgwage) as a proxy for human capital, the
capital-labour ratio (K/L) to control for relative factor
intensity in production, the debt-to-assets ratio (debt/
asset) to account for ﬁnancial indebtedness, return on
assets (ROA) as a measure of proﬁtability, the share of
intangibles in total assets (intangibles/assets) as a proxy
for ﬁrm tacit knowledge, ﬁrm age, a dummy for ﬁrms
established before 1994, when the available dataset
begins, region dummies, and 2-digit NACE industry
dummies. Apart from ﬁrm-level regressors that are
constant within each ﬁrm spell, we include hostcountry-speciﬁc variables (xc ) that vary within the
ﬁrm spell but are identical within each host-country
unit. These include the log of host country population
to account for market size and the log of its GDP per
capita to control for level of development and production cost. Finally, the ﬁrm-country-speciﬁc set of
variables (xic ) includes information on ﬁrm i's exports
of goods to host country c, its imports of goods, exports of services, imports of services, outward FDI to
country c, and foreign ownership over ﬁrm i from
country c. Initially, these variables enter the model in
binary form, followed by speciﬁcation using logarithmic values of these variables.
We test Hypothesis 1(aec) (that lower quality of
economic, political, and legal institutions in the host
country increases the probability of IAs) by
including the level of host country's institutions as
measured by ﬁve Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI): (i) Regulatory Quality as a proxy for economic institutions; (ii) Political Stability and
Absence of Violence, (iii) Government Effectiveness,

4

The results are similar and thus omitted. They are available upon request.

and (iv) Control of Corruption as proxies for political institutions; and (v) Rule of Law as a proxy for
legal institutions. The hypothesis is corroborated if
the coefﬁcients on the institutional indicators are
statistically signiﬁcant and negative.
To test Hypothesis 2 that ﬁrms are more likely to
implement IAs to emerging markets compared to
developed markets, we add a CEE dummy and a set
of interaction terms between IA determinants and
the CEE dummy (CEE*xi ; CEE*xc ; CEE*xic ) to the
above speciﬁcation (1). Hypothesis 2 will be
corroborated if the coefﬁcient on the CEE dummy is
statistically signiﬁcant and positive. Coefﬁcients on
interaction terms will identify the differences in the
pattern of IAs between CEE and non-CEE host
countries.
2.2 Results
We begin by presenting simple summary statistics
for ﬁrms with IAs in years 2015 and 2016 in comparison to the population of ﬁrms and in contrast to
exporters, foreign-owned ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with
foreign subsidiaries abroad (Table 1). The median
ﬁrm using IAs is on average 3.5 times larger in terms
of employment, 4.8 times larger in revenue, pays an
85% higher average wage per employee, and generates 63% higher value added per employee than
the population median ﬁrm. These are useful
comparative data that do not exist in the typical IA
research that predominantly looks at management
patterns (Dowling, Festing & Engle, 2013). Assigning
ﬁrms are also much more likely to export, have
considerably higher export intensity, exhibit higher
proﬁtability, and experience a better total factor
productivity. They perform better compared to
foreign-owned ﬁrms and exporters (except in terms
of labour productivity). Firms assigning employees
to CEE countries have better performance indicators
than ﬁrms posting their employees to non-CEE
countries. This is consistent with previous research
arguing that only the most productive ﬁrms can
overcome the high transaction costs related to doing
business in less stable and (perceivably) riskier environments (Rasciute & Downward, 2017).
Half of IAs are used by companies from the construction sector (51.2%), followed by the
manufacturing industry (35.5%) (Fig. 1). Because of
speciﬁcities of IAs in construction (these IAs are far
less concerned with control or knowledge acquisition and transfer), we omit this sector from the
remaining part of the analysis.
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Table 1. Comparison of ﬁrms with international assignments and other internationally engaged enterprises in Slovenia, 2015e2016.
ln(emp)#

ln(rev)#

Exporter

Ex share

ln(wage)#

VA/emp#

ROA

TFP

Age

Int Assign
N ¼ 5049
Assign to CEE
N ¼ 526
Exporters
N ¼ 39,961
iFDI
N ¼ 15,759
oFDI
N ¼ 1039

1.95
(1.30)
2.77
(1.45)
1.15
(1.24)
0.94
(1.69)
3.17
(2.00)

12.69
(2.30)
13.94
(1.90)
12.64
(1.98)
12.78
(5.27)
15.34
(3.49)

77.8%
(0.416)
76.5%
(0.424)
100.0%
(/)
63.6%
(0.481)
80.4%
(0.397)

48.1%
(0.423)
35.8%
(0.391)
40.1%
(0.388)
36.4%
(0.424)
35.3%
(0.362)

9.54
(1.01)
9.84
(0.63)
9.48
(3.19)
9.46
(4.59)
10.10
(2.76)

17,339
(19,589)
24,822
(19,577)
20,043
(133,948)
22,374
(866,488)
39,033
(147,236)

5.1%
(18.1%)
6.3%
(12.0%)
4.7%
(17.4%)
1.9%
(0.21%)
4.0%
(11.7%)

4.03
(6.31)
3.34
(6.08)
0.35
(3.72)
0.65
(3.80)
0.60
(3.57)

7.8
(7.2)
11.6
(7.8)
10.6
(7.83)
9.7
(7.5)
17.3
(6.0)

Total
N ¼ 121,150

0.69
(1.06)

11.13
(4.42)

33.0%
(0.470)

13.3%
(0.292)

8.92
(4.36)

10,629
(201,552)

1.4%
(18.8%)

0.009
(4.31)

9.6
(7.8)

Note: # report median values, otherwise average values of the variables are stated. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ln(emp) is log
of employment, ln(rev) is log of revenue, Exporter is exporter dummy, Ex share is share of exports in total revenue, ln(wage) is log of
average wage per employee, VA/emp is value added per employee, ROA is return on assets, TFP is total factor productivity estimated by
Ackerberg et al. (2015) procedure, Int Assign are ﬁrms with international assignments, iFDI are foreign-owned ﬁrms, oFDI are ﬁrms with
outward foreign direct investment and Total is the entire population of ﬁrms in 2015 and 2016.
Source: own calculations.

Most of the IAs outside of construction are
directed to Slovenia's largest trade partners or
neighbours. The CEE region hosts only 6.1% IAs
from Slovenia in 2016 (Fig. 2). Also, a vast majority
of assigning ﬁrms (74.5% in 2015 and 75.5% in 2016)
implement more than one IA per year (by excluding
sole proprietors this percentage increases further
and exceeds 80%).
We now present the results of the analysis of
ﬁrms' decisions about the location of IAs (Table 2).
1.4%
2.6%

4.3%

4.9%

16.0%
2.5%

The results in columns (1) and (2) show speciﬁcations with a full set of ﬁrm-level, host-country-level
and ﬁrm-country-speciﬁc variables. In column (1),
we use a binary type of ﬁrm-country-speciﬁc variables, indicating only whether a ﬁrm exports, imports or has direct investments in a given host
country. In column (2), we test whether not only the
presence but also the extent of international business linkages with a host country inﬂuences the
decision to assign an employee to that country. To
this end, we use the logarithm of the value of exports, imports, and FDI stocks instead of the
dichotomous indicators. Sending at least one
employee to a particular host country is positively
associated with ﬁrm size in terms of employment,
export status and export share, average wage per

12.1%

4.9%

4.2%
4.3%

13.2%

C-33

C-rest

F-41

48.2%

6.8%

3.6%
C-28

2.0%

2.6%

34.6%

C-25

1.5% 3.8%

1.8%

F-42

F-43

G

M

N

Other

Fig. 1. Distribution of ﬁrms with international assignments by industry, 2015e2016. Source: own calculations. Note: The artwork depicts the number of assignments in an industry as a share in the total
number of assignments in 2015 and 2016. C-25 ¼ Manufacture of
fabricated metal products; C-28 ¼ Manufacture of machinery and
equipment; C-33 ¼ Repair and installation of machinery and equipment; C-rest ¼ Rest of manufacturing; F-41 ¼ Construction of
buildings; F-42 ¼ Civil engineering; F-43 ¼ Specialised construction
activities; G ¼ Wholesale and retail trade; M ¼ Professional, scientiﬁc
and technical activities; N ¼ Administrative and support service
activities.

24.8%

DE

AT

BE

IT

HR

NL

CH

FR

other non-CEE

other CEE

Fig. 2. Geographical distribution of ﬁrms with international assignments by host country, 2016. Source: own calculations. Note: In
artwork, grey depicts countries belonging to the CEE group (construction
sector is omitted).
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Table 2. Decision to post employees to an individual host country.

Firm-level variables:
TFP

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4a)

(4b)

(5a)

(5b)

Logit

Logit

Logit

bnonCEE

bCEE

bnonCEE

bCEE

0.00441
(0.0312)
0.523***
(0.0518)
0.110***
(0.0256)
0.712***
(0.123)
0.988***
(0.122)
0.419**
(0.175)
0.589**
(0.254)
0.190**
(0.0840)
0.218***
(0.0297)
0.177**
(0.0786)
0.626***
(0.216)
2.479
(4.036)
4.229*
(2.557)
0.0364***
(0.00776)
0.0104
(0.165)

0.00114
(0.0315)
0.525***
(0.0527)
0.109***
(0.0259)
0.686***
(0.124)
1.019***
(0.122)
0.441**
(0.177)
0.553**
(0.253)
0.190**
(0.0844)
0.219***
(0.0300)
0.183**
(0.0786)
0.637***
(0.217)
2.057
(4.130)
3.982
(2.549)
0.0362***
(0.00775)
0.0259
(0.165)

0.000302
(0.0318)
0.548***
(0.0508)
0.124***
(0.0256)
0.690***
(0.127)
1.153***
(0.121)
0.518***
(0.171)
0.573**
(0.248)
0.130
(0.0853)
0.219***
(0.0303)
0.164**
(0.0766)
0.611***
(0.220)
2.056
(3.853)
3.939
(2.402)
0.0418***
(0.00771)
0.0132
(0.166)

0.00489
(0.0366)
0.421***
(0.104)
0.0214b
(0.0668)
0.570***
(0.220)
0.406**a
(0.206)
0.238
(0.275)
0.439
(0.425)
0.617***a
(0.182)
0.189***
(0.0676)
0.359**
(0.166)
0.854**
(0.411)
1.005
(7.968)
3.610
(4.328)
0.00563a
(0.0136)
0.1548
(0.252)

0.00694
(0.0319)
0.554***
(0.0505)
0.119***
(0.0256)
0.711***
(0.126)
1.142***
(0.121)
0.468***
(0.168)
0.562**
(0.245)
0.128
(0.0853)
0.217***
(0.0302)
0.160**
(0.0772)
0.597***
(0.220)
2.251
(3.815)
4.058*
(2.413)
0.0412***
(0.00771)
0.000874
(0.166)

0.0125
(0.0365)
0.450***
(0.102)
0.00312b
(0.0633)
0.607***
(0.220)
0.408**a
(0.205)
0.282
(0.284)
0.515
(0.430)
0.613***a
(0.182)
0.186***
(0.0678)
0.349**
(0.169)
0.894**
(0.411)
1.940
(7.730)
4.108
(4.473)
0.00699a
(0.0137)
0.132
(0.253)

1.900***
(0.0749)
0.771***
(0.246)
0.120
(0.165)
1.293***
(0.201)
0.578***
(0.173)
0.769***
(0.180)
0.880***
(0.0531)
0.572***
(0.0798)

2.325***
(0.165)
1.919***
(0.0640)
0.813***
(0.208)
0.692***
(0.159)
0.438*
(0.239)
0.707***
(0.183)
0.103
(0.193)
0.694***
(0.0450)
1.304***
(0.141)

14.92
(17.81)
2.128***
(0.0970)
0.0357
(0.217)
1.217***
(0.200)
0.684
(0.427)
1.684***
(0.301)
0.292
(0.361)
0.821***
(0.0639)
1.540***
(0.189)

1.413**
(0.587)
1.748
(1.979)
2.330**
(0.977)
1.023
(0.659)
1.562**
(0.683)
2.096
(1.637)
0.251a
(0.153)
0.492
(1.860)

18.60
(17.93)
2.166***
(0.0976)
0.0325
(0.219)
1.249***
(0.202)
0.753*
(0.430)
1.736***
(0.305)
0.296
(0.364)
0.835***
(0.0647)
1.572***
(0.192)

1.342**
(0.587)
1.575
(1.989)
2.458**
(0.993)
1.056
(0.666)
1.697**
(0.688)
2.385
(1.652)
0.245a
(0.153)
0.127
(1.882)

0.0404***
(0.00915)
0.0133*
(0.00778)
0.0887***
(0.0169)
0.0550***
(0.0208)
0.0356

0.410***
(0.0922)
0.0658
(0.0702)
0.709***
(0.191)
0.770***
(0.223)
0.851***

0.319***
(0.0937)
0.0859
(0.0756)
0.766***
(0.198)
0.746***
(0.225)
0.163

0.641***
(0.184)
0.0506
(0.157)
0.271
(0.334)
0.968***
(0.309)
1.031**

0.0268***
(0.00907)
0.0209**
(0.00828)
0.0885***
(0.0176)
0.0544**
(0.0212)
0.0357

0.0695***a
(0.0178)
0.0202
(0.0169)
0.0538
(0.0331)
0.0719**
(0.0318)
0.0510

0.00159
(0.0312)
ln(emp)
0.516***
(0.0526)
ln(revenue)
0.112***
(0.0258)
I(exporter)
0.683***
(0.124)
export share
1.005***
(0.122)
inFDI
0.447**
(0.176)
outFDI
0.573**
(0.254)
ln(avgwage)
0.191**
(0.0840)
K/L
0.220***
(0.0299)
debt/asset
0.182**
(0.0782)
ROA
0.635***
(0.216)
(intang/assets)2
2.224
(4.078)
intangibles/assets
4.076
(2.539)
Age
0.0367***
(0.00773)
I(old)
0.0263
(0.164)
Host-country-speciﬁc variables:
CEE dummy
(Hypothesis 2)
ln(distance)
1.874***
(0.0753)
regulatory quality
0.768***
(Hypothesis 1a)
(0.242)
political stability
0.100
(Hypothesis 1b)
(0.163)
gov. effectiveness
1.215***
(Hypothesis 1b)
(0.202)
contr. of corruption
0.575***
(Hypothesis 1b)
(0.171)
rule of law
0.716***
(Hypothesis 1c)
(0.179)
ln(population)
0.862***
(0.0524)
ln(GDP p.c.)
0.555***
(0.0797)
Firm-country-speciﬁc variables:ǂ
goods EX to cntry
0.451***
(0.0922)
goods IM from cntry
0.000296
(0.0701)
serv. EX to cntry
0.725***
(0.187)
serv. IM from cntry
0.768***
(0.218)
outFDI to cntry
0.884***

(continued on next page)
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Table 2. (continued )

inFDI from cntry
constant
N
Log likelihood
Region FE
Industry FE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4a)

(4b)

(5a)

(5b)

Logit

Logit

Logit

bnonCEE

bCEE

bnonCEE

bCEE

(0.323)
0.201
(0.211)
19.94***
(1.606)

(0.0265)
0.00467
(0.0161)
20.23***
(1.620)

(0.323)
0.149
(0.213)
2.119
(2.102)

(0.410)
0.233
(0.221)
4.963
(3.289)

(0.450)
0.410
(0.823)

(0.0331)
0.00203
(0.0171)
5.298
(3.317)

(0.0355)
0.0207
(0.0532)

1,035,183
11,350
yes
yes

1,034,951
11,191
Yes
Yes

1,035,183
11,109
yes
yes

1,035,183
11,020
Yes
Yes

1,034,951
10,966
Yes
Yes

Note: Dependent variable is dummy variable for ﬁrm sending at least one employee on an international assignment to a given host
country in 2016. Standard errors clustered at ﬁrm-level are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate a signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report results from the CEE interaction speciﬁcation b0 þ b1 CEE þ Xb2 þ ðCEE *XÞb3 , where (4a) and
(5a) report coefﬁcients b2 for non-CEE countries and (4b) and (5b) report coefﬁcients b2 þ b3 for CEE countries and the corresponding
standard error of the sum. a (b) in columns (4b) and (5b) indicates variables for which the corresponding b3 on the interaction term CEE*X
is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% (5%) level. ǂ speciﬁcations in columns (1), (3) and (4) use binary indicators for ﬁrm-country-speciﬁc
variables, while (2) and (5) use logged values of these variables. Hypotheses 1e2 denote variables that test Hypotheses 1e2 respectively.
Source: own calculations.

employee, proﬁtability, labour intensity, and
indebtedness. Human capital reﬂected in higher
average wages affects the international transfer of
employees positively, implying that IAs can serve as
a channel of knowledge transfer. Next, expatriation
is more prevalent among labour intensive ﬁrms
where person-to-person interaction is more essential. The intangible assets of a ﬁrm have a non-linear
effect on expatriation, initially decreasing the probability of IAs at lower shares of intangible assets,
while increasing it at higher shares.5 This could be
explained by the dual role of IAs in knowledge
transfers. Firms with lower tacit knowledge use international transfers to acquire knowledge from
abroad, while ﬁrms with abundant intangible assets
use their expatriates to transfer and augment
knowledge through inter- and intra-organisational
networks (Bj€
orkman, Barner-Rasmussen & Li, 2004;
Minbaeva & Michailova, 2004).
Moving to host country-level determinants, we
observe that traditional gravity model variables
perform as expected: market size and level of
development increase the odds of sending employees to a destination country, while geographic
distance between Slovenia and host country decreases them. Where economic institutions as
measured by the WGI regulatory quality index are
of higher quality, the probability of IAs is higher. A
better quality of legal institutions (as assessed by the
WGI rule of law index) similarly attracts more IAs.
The quality of political institutions in a host country
matters as well: the better control of corruption in a

country attracts IAs more often, yet there is no effect
of political stability in the pooled sample of both
CEE and non-CEE host countries. The only institutional quality index that exhibits a negative association with IAs is the government effectiveness
index. Where the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures is lower, there
is a higher probability that ﬁrms assign their employees. This might mean that ﬁrms believe that IAs
can be an effective instrument for protecting ﬁrm
assets and interests in more unfavourable environments with higher policy instability. It may also
imply that emerging market ﬁrms asses that they
are capable of inﬂuencing host country institutions
in other emerging markets through international
assignees as commercial diplomats. Our results
thereby indicate that commercial diplomacy is
linked to poor political (rather than economic) institutions. All in all, our results partially conﬁrm
Hypothesis 1b, that the host countries with a lower
quality of political institutions attract more IAs. On
the other hand, Hypotheses 1a and 1c are rejected,
as emerging market ﬁrms are more likely to assign
their employees to host countries with a higher
quality of economic and legal institutions.
Turning to the last group of determinants, which
are ﬁrm- and host-country-speciﬁc, reveals that
ﬁrms that export goods to a country, export services
to a country, or import services from a country are
signiﬁcantly more likely to assign their employees
there. From speciﬁcation (1) in Table 2, we see that

5
This conclusion follows from calculating marginal effects of intangibles on the probability to assign at different values of the share of intangible assets in
total assets.
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the exporting of goods to a country increases the
odds of posting an employee there by 57%, exporting services to a country by 106%, and importing
services from a country raises the assignment
probability by 116%. Having subsidiary in a country
increases the probability of IAs, conditional on
being an outward foreign direct investor.
Combining the coefﬁcients on ‘outFDI’ and ‘outFDI
to a country’ yields that for foreign direct investors
the odds of an IA to a host country increase by 36%
if they have a subsidiary in that country. Conversely,
foreign direct investors with no subsidiary in a
country have a 44% lower probability of posting an
employee to this country compared to ﬁrms without
outward FDI. Slovenian multinationals are thus
much more bound within their existing network of
subsidiaries abroad in posting IAs than ﬁrms
without foreign direct investment abroad. Foreign
ownership, on the other hand, reduces the odds of
IAs, especially to countries from which none of the
foreign owners of the Slovenian subsidiary originates. This may be because the direction of IAs
within multinationals is more prevalent in the direction from headquarters to subsidiaries. Unfortunately, we have no data on inbound assignments to
test this. In speciﬁcation (2), where we use the
values of export, import and FDI linkages between
the ﬁrm and potential host country, the results
conﬁrm a positive association between IAs and exports of goods and services to a country and imports
of services from a country. In contrast to the dummy
variable speciﬁcation in column (1), the value of
outward and inward FDI stock is not relevant in
explaining the probability to assign workers to a
speciﬁc host country.
In column (3) of Table 2, we augment speciﬁcation
(1) with a CEE dummy that distinguishes CEE
countries from non-CEE European countries. Once
we control for ﬁrm-level, country-level, and ﬁrmcountry-speciﬁc factors, ﬁrms have a 90% lower
probability of assigning employees to CEE countries
compared to non-CEE countries. The inclusion of
the CEE dummy does not affect the ﬁrm-level and
ﬁrm-country-speciﬁc variables much, but increases
the effect of political stability and diminishes the
effects of government effectiveness and the rule of
law.
Comparing CEE with non-CEE host counties
(columns (4a) and (4b)) suggests that revenue and
average wage are more inﬂuential predictors for IAs
to the CEE region (the interaction terms CEE*xi are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant). Conversely, the
export intensity of a ﬁrm and the size of host
country are less important for IAs to the CEE region.
These differences between the two groups of host

countries are corroborated in speciﬁcation (5),
where we use logarithmic values of ﬁrm-countryspeciﬁc variables instead of simple dichotomous
indicators from speciﬁcation (4). Once we allow for
different partial effects of each of the regressors in
speciﬁcations (4) and (5), there is no signiﬁcant
preference anymore in favour of IAs to the non-CEE
region (both CEE dummies turn insigniﬁcant).
Country size and geographic distance from Slovenia
matter less for IAs to CEE host countries. Two
additional differences between CEE and non-CEE
host countries are identiﬁed by speciﬁcations (4) and
(5). First, a ﬁrm's export of services to a non-CEE
country increases the odds of IAs to this region but
does not inﬂuence IAs to CEE countries. Second, the
previously identiﬁed association between the presence of a foreign subsidiary and IAs to a country is
applicable only in CEE host countries. In summary,
the results reject Hypothesis 2 claiming that
emerging market ﬁrms are more likely to implement IAs to other emerging markets.

3 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we study the differences in assignment-related decisions made by emerging market
ﬁrms internationalising into either emerging or
developed economies. Building on institutional
theory, we use a contextualised approach to studying IAs. Based on data for the entire ﬁrm population
in a selected CEE country (Slovenia), we provide
one of the ﬁrst empirical assessments of countrylevel determinants of IA implementation and location choices by emerging market ﬁrms. In our
analysis, we speciﬁcally stress the under-researched
differences in determinants of emerging market
ﬁrms' decisions to utilise IAs in CEE markets
compared to non-CEE markets.
Emerging market ﬁrms from Slovenia expatriate more
strongly to countries with high institutional quality. Our
results with respect to Hypothesis 1 show that
emerging market businesses are more likely to use
IAs in environments with high quality economic,
political, and legal institutions e even after controlling for their existing trade and investment
network. This is contrary to our expectations that
ﬁrms would send more assignees to emerging
markets in order to reduce uncertainty (Berry, 2017;
Boyacigiller, 1990; Moreira & Ogasavara, 2018).
Emerging market ﬁrms from low quality institutional contexts, such as Slovenian enterprises, may
be more used to, or more comfortable with, institutional uncertainty and may rely less on control
and coordination IAs (Edstr€
om & Galbraith, 1977).
Instead, ﬁrms from emerging markets may be
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strongly focussed on knowledge acquisition and the
reverse transfer of insights through IAs (Fang et al.,
2010; Hocking et al., 2004; Lazarova & Tarique, 2005;
Zhu et al., 2018) that they can gain in countries with
high quality economic, political, and legal institutions. Firms from emerging markets with low
quality institutions may also beneﬁt more in terms
of their learning from expatriating into markets with
high quality institutions compared to enterprises
that originate in a context with high quality institutions. Overall, we build on Zaheer et al. (2012)
to nuance the institutional literature with respect to
IAs from low quality institutional contexts and
reﬁne the insights of the international business
literature in relation to the inﬂuences of institutional
quality on assignment objectives (Edstr€
om & Galbraith, 1977; Hocking et al., 2004; Reiche et al., 2009).
Beyond legal and economic context factors, we get
mixed results for the impact of political institution
indices on the utilisation of IAs: while better control
of corruption in a country attracts IAs, there is no
effect of political stability (e.g. security) on the ﬁrms'
likelihood to assign in the pooled sample of both
CEE and non-CEE host countries. The only institutional quality index that exhibits the expected
negative association with IAs is the government
effectiveness index. This implies that speciﬁc aspects of political stability have different effects on
the ﬁrms' likelihood to assign. While assignees
cannot nullify the problem of corruption, they can
act as an effective instrument for protecting ﬁrm
assets and interests in environments with a low
quality of public services, low quality of civil service,
and with a high degree of political pressures. We
argue that assignees can have the role of working
towards creating a favourable business environment
for a ﬁrm in the host country and establishing the
ﬁrm's legitimacy abroad. Ru€
el and Visser (2014)
describe this as commercial diplomacy. Our ﬁndings give a more nuanced understanding of the
institutional host context, which allows us to identify
commercial diplomacy reasons for expatriation.
Thus, we propose a subtle addition to the roles of
expatriates outlined by Baruch et al. (2013), who
depict a set of variables that shape the roles of expatriates. These range from the IA type and duration to cultural differences and tasks dimensions.
We suggest that an assignee as a commercial
diplomat needs to understand and navigate the
dynamic and weakly enforced institutional context
of the host country. As such, assignees as commercial diplomats may use the poor institutional environment to the advantage of the ﬁrm through
negotiation or delaying tactics in relation to some of
the institutional requirements and dynamics. The
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role of commercial diplomat and its dependence on
the quality of the institutional context adds nuance
to the expatriation literature. One of the practical
implications would be to select assignees factoring
in these and other role proﬁles and prepare them for
these tasks in advance of expatriation.
Emerging market ﬁrms from Slovenia expatriate more
strongly to institutionally dissimilar countries. In relation to Hypothesis 2, our data shows that e against
what the institutional literature would predict e
emerging market ﬁrms are more likely to send expatriates to developed countries and less likely to
other emerging markets. Once we control for ﬁrmlevel, country-level, and ﬁrm-country-speciﬁc factors, ﬁrms are 90% less likely to assign employees to
CEE countries compared to non-CEE countries. This
indicates that despite the historic connections between Slovenia and other CEE markets in Europe,
these connections do not result in a greater likelihood to assign to CEE markets. In fact, ﬁrms operating in Slovenia are more likely to assign to nonCEE countries. The reasons may include that (as the
more developed environments) non-CEE countries
often embody better learning opportunities and are
institutionally less difﬁcult and taxing for assignees
(Bhagat et al., 2002; Caligiuri & Bonache, 2016).
Based on our research results, we strengthen our
conclusion that ﬁrms use (although overall less) IAs
for control and coordination purposes in emerging
host markets, but they are more driven by learning
and leadership development motives in developed
host countries (see also Zhu et al., 2018). Our work
thus reﬁnes the expatriation literature (Baruch,
Steele & Quantrill, 2002; Edstr€
om & Galbraith, 1977;
Mayrhofer, 2001) by showing that the broad institutional context and not just organisational rationale
seems to be important for major expatriation ﬂows.
Our ﬁndings suggest that, when analysing the
impact of institutional differences on internationalisation and international stafﬁng, the direction
(rather than solely the magnitude) of distance
should be considered (Zaheer et al., 2012). Firms
from one emerging market, Slovenia, choose higher
institutional distance locations presumably to
strengthen learning effects and (reverse) knowledge
ﬂows by IAs. Institutional distance may have a
different impact depending on whether an
emerging or a developed market enterprise is
entering an emerging or a developed market (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018). Overall, our work reﬁnes the
understanding of institutional inﬂuences on international stafﬁng patterns, nuances the insights into
the expatriation patterns of ﬁrms embedded in low
quality institutional contexts, and adds to the understanding of the effects of institutional distance.

14

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW 2022;24:1e18

We reiterate that it is not only the institutional
context that is important for IA-related decisions. It
is also the administrative heritage of ﬁrms (Bartlett
& Ghoshal, 1989), the experience of enterprises
handling low quality institutional contexts, and
further business drivers that impact the ﬁrms'
expatriation decisions. For instance, the expatriation
literature has long identiﬁed knowledge acquisition
and individual interests as key drivers of IAs
(Dickmann et al., 2008). This suggests that a more
holistic assessment of IA drivers and decisions
needs to include individual, organisational, and
institutional elements. Overall, our contribution reﬁnes institutional theory and its application to international business in general and expatriation in
particular.
Managerial Relevance. We have argued above that
ﬁrms from emerging markets e at least where we
looked at the assignment patterns of all ﬁrms from
Slovenia e expatriate more strongly to countries
with high institutional legal and economic quality
and, against our predictions, to host countries that
are more institutionally dissimilar. In terms of a
managerial contribution our ﬁndings have implications for the pre-assignment, expatriation, and postassignment phase. During pre-assignment, ﬁrms
would do well to factor in how expatriation candidates cope with uncertainty and learning depending
on the institutional environment of the home and
host markets in their global mobility selection
criteria and decision-making. Our ﬁndings thus
support prior calls for organisations to coordinate
their talent and global mobility management more
strongly when faced with large institutional distances between home and host markets (Cerdin &
Brewster, 2014). This would also allow ﬁrms to
prepare expatriates for IAs to emerging markets
differently than assignees for IAs to developed
markets. The on-assignment support and communication mechanisms implemented by organisations
could also depend on the institutional quality of
host environments. Where emerging market ﬁrms
expatriate to locations embedded in high quality
institutions in developed countries, host teams
could be prepared to be supportive and to facilitate
the assignee's learning (Toh & DeNisi, 2005).
We have seen that knowledge acquisition and
transfer is important for emerging market companies' choice of assignment locations. Thus, during
and post an assignment, it is important to create a
receptive learning atmosphere and to encourage
home organisation knowledge absorption and use
(Lazarova & Tarique, 2005; Oddou, Osland & Blakeney, 2009). In addition, given the developmental
nature of these assignments, organisations should

develop strong on-assignment and post-assignment
retention mechanisms (Dickmann et al., 2018).
Limitations. Despite its numerous insights for both
academia and practitioners, our study has several
limitations, which present an opportunity for
further research. First, we use a single-country
database that does not allow for comparisons of
potential differences in IA-related decisions made
by ﬁrms from both emerging and developed markets. Future research could thus explore assignment-related decisions in all possible directions
based on the level of host and home country institutional development.
Second, future research could consider different
ownership structures of ﬁrms in their IA location
choices and the resulting ﬁrm performance as well
as the impact of subsidiary role (Chung et al., 2015)
or network interrelatedness (Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1986; Boyacigiller, 1990). Third, research into the
outcomes of assignment-related decisions (which
may be different for emerging and developed markets) is hindered due to the lack of longitudinal data
on IAs. A longitudinal approach would provide insights into the dynamics of ﬁrms' decisions
regarding international employee mobility e
discovering which purposes IAs are used for at what
stages of ﬁrm/market development and whether
this is also location-determined. As institutions also
change over time, the dynamic impact of institutional factors on international stafﬁng should also be
considered by future research on the topic e
providing insights on whether over time international stafﬁng strategies by emerging and developed
market ﬁrms are converging or diverging further
(see e.g. Friel, 2011).
Theoretically, we reﬁne the evolving understanding of global mobility and its institutional embeddedness. While most of the global mobility literature
focusses on individual and organisational reasons
for IAs (Dickmann et al., 2008), we identify macrolevel contextual factors such as the quality of economic, political, and legal institutions. Moving
beyond micro (individual) and mezzo (organisational) perspectives has already been called for by
the emerging literature on macro-talent ﬂows
(Khilji, Tarique & Schuler, 2015).
While our study shows that the main principles
suggested by the institutional theory are applicable
to international employee mobility, we reﬁne the
theoretical insights with respect to institutional
quality (also by type of institution) and distance. The
literature indicates that ﬁrms predominantly use IAs
into emerging markets to reduce risks and ﬁll skill
gaps. In contrast, our data shows that ﬁrms from
emerging market economies have stronger
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expatriation patterns into developed countries,
presumably for developmental and knowledge
transfer reasons. Our work enables researchers to
draw up a more detailed IA-decision model that can
capture broader expatriation ﬂows into institutional
systems rather than focusing on small sub-groups of
assignees. Therefore, it does not simply add to the
institutional, internationalisation, and expatriation
literature, but may also encourage institutional actors to rethink and reﬁne their approaches. As such,
our study is an important step towards an internationalisation theory inclusive of international
employee mobility.
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